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FINANCING NEW MACHINERY FOR MORTGAGED
PENNSYLVANIA INDUSTRIAL
PLANTS.
FAIRFAX LEARY, JR.t
F THE LIFE OF THE LAW is experience and not logic, as Mr.
Justice Holmes once remarked, then from time to time we should re-
examine doctrines long taken for granted and apply to them the test
of experience. We should re-visit the scenes of ancient legal struggles
to be sure that, through long repetition, we are not, parrot-like, quot-
ing sentences out of full context, or applying dicta to situations never
in the minds of the judges responsible for the words, and to which
they might not, themselves, have applied those words. Indeed, con-
siderations of policy not only today, but in earlier times, may have
cried out for a different result.
It is the thesis of this Article that the so-called "Pennsylvania
Industrial Plant Mortgage Doctrine" ' is a case in point. At the hands
of some authors, and in the language of the opinions of some judges,
a far greater effect has been given to the doctrine than the matters
to be decided have required, with possible damage to the development
of the economy of Pennsylvania. Who can say what factors actually
determine the decision to locate or not to locate a new plant in Pennsyl-
vania? Economic considerations play the vital role, of course. Tax
considerations play an important part. But rules of law play a part
too, and a rule of law that inhibits the future growth of a company
by placing obstacles in the path of financing its future expansion is
not a rule of law that will tend to persuade businessmen to locate new
plants in Pennsylvania. Nor is it a rule of law that will aid businesses
t A.B. 1932, Princeton University; LL.B. 1935, Harvard Law School; Member
of the Bar of District of Columbia, New York, Pennsylvania and Philadelphia.
Reporter for Bank Collections Article, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.
1. This is the doctrine that a mortgage on an industrial plant covers, without
words of description in the mortgage, or filing in the chattel security records, the
machinery, equipment and chattels "which form essential parts of the plant for
the purpose of manufacturing the product there made...." First Nat'l Bank v.
Reichneder, 371 Pa. 463, 91 A.2d 277 (1952) ; cf. In re Ginsberg, 225 F.2d 358 (3d
Cir. 1958). See, e.g., Robinson, McGough, and Scheinholtz, The Effect of the Uniform
Commercial Code on the Pennsylvania Industrial Plant Doctrine, 16 U. PITT. L. RXv.
89 (1951); LADNER, CONVEYANCING IN PENNSYLVANIA 134 (1956 Supp. by P.N.
Wood).
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already in Pennsylvania in the competitive struggle to expand, and
through expansion to provide greater employment, greater tax revenue
and so promote the welfare of the Commonwealth and its people.
If a careful examination of the original bases of the doctrine should
disclose no necessity or reason to apply it to certain situations, the
effort will not have been wasted. Cessat ratione lex, cessat ipse lex,
is a maxim not without force today. Translated somewhat loosely it
means that a rule of law should not be extended beyond the needs for
satisfying the policy giving rise to the rule.
General Factual Situation
The factual situation with which we will be concerned in this
Article is the conflict between the holder of a validly perfected and
recognized chattel security interest in a chattel subsequently affixed
to the realty or integrated in a plant or structure, and the holder of
a prior real property mortgage. Specifically, we can suppose a case
where the owner of an industrial plant desires to acquire, on conditional
sale, new machinery to enable him to diversify his line of products.
He has space in his existing building and his credit is such that a
bank or other financing institution will take an assignment of the
vendor's interest in the conditional sales contract upon terms satis-
factory to the manufacturer and the equipment vendor. But there is
a prior real estate mortgage on the plant. The real estate mortgagee
may claim that the new machinery becomes subject to the lien of his
mortgage as soon as it is used in the plant. The conditional vendor
and the financing institution will not permit the sale to go through
unless they can be assured of a first and prior lien on the machinery
so acquired and the right to re-possess the same in the event of default
by the vendee in making his installment payments.
A resolution of the conflict between these two interests actually
involves questions extending beyond the two interests nominally in-
volved. Policy considerations require that thought be given to the
effect of conflicting solutions on plant modernization programs, the
development of new products and processes, the ability of Pennsyl-
vania corporations to afford continued employment by financing the
acquisition of new machinery and new lines of business, and the con-
sequent effect on the revenues of the Commonwealth.
It is easy to say, as some have, that a decision preferring the
interest of the prior real property mortgagee can cause no hardship
SUMMER 1959]
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to subsequent chattel vendors, as they can readily obtain the consent
of the mortgagee.2 Such statements are, however, somewhat unrealistic,
and certainly show a somewhat provincial concept of who an industrial
mortgagee may be. Consider first the case of the corporate trust
mortgage securing a substantial bond issue. The corporate trustee will
not or cannot give consents binding upon the bondholders unless
specific provision for such an agreement to subordinate the mortgage
lien is clearly present in the trust indenture. Securing the necessary
two-thirds consent of the bondholders for an amendment is almost an
impossibility, and if the subordination is not permitted by the terms
of the usual article on amendments, it can be guaranteed that 100%
consent will not be obtainable. Even assuming the industrial plant
mortgage is held by one interest, that interest may be an elderly
female, a suspicious and illogical individual, a minor not capable of
giving consent except after lengthy legal proceedings, or a trustee
under a will or deed of trust which does not specifically authorize the
giving of consent. Most of us are familiar with the rule of policy
guiding many trustees which apparently reads "You cannot be sur-
charged for saying no." Consent of the mortgagee is not a readily
obtainable document, and a rule of law based upon a supposed "readily
obtainable consent of the mortgagee," is a rule granting priority to
the real estate mortgagee. Indeed, the rule may have certain impli-
cations fostering restraint of trade and tending toward monopoly if
the mortgagee is a financial institution.' The "readily obtainable" con-
sent may be consent conditioned upon financing through the mortgagee
and upon his terms.
Legislative Policy
To the extent that the legislature declares the preferred policy of
the Commonwealth, it has stated that the interest of the state is best
served by preferring the interest of the chattel vendor, both in 1935'
and again in 1953 when the Uniform Commercial Code was enacted.'
Actually, such legislative intent was indicated as long ago as 1915,6
2. See, e.g., Shaffer, J. in Central Lithograph Co. v. Eatmor Chocolate Co., 316
Pa. 300, 175 Atl. 697 (1934) and 83 U. PA. L. lRv. 916 (1934).
3. Compare the cases and legislation against mortgages requiring that insurance
be placed through affiliated insurance brokerage outfits, and the general antitrust
prohibitions against "tie-in" sales.
4. The Act approved July 12, 1935, P.L. 658 (since repealed by the UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE) amending the UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES AcT.
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-313 (1953).
6. Act of June 17, 1915, P.L. 866.
[VOL. 4: p. 498
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and reiterated in language not sufficient to do the job in 1923, 1925
and 1927!
It has been stated that the industrial plant mortgage doctrine
may require that the prior real estate mortgagee be preferred, and
that it may be beyond the power of the legislature to change this
rule as to mortgages placed of record before the enactment of the
legislative rule.' The writer believes that neither of these propositions
is necessarily correct, and that a court faced with the problem today
could and should reach the opposite conclusions.
It is, therefore, appropriate that we examine in some detail the
origins of the doctrine, and the extent of its application. One further
preliminary word, however. The writer does not belong to what might
be called the Gertrude Stein school of legal reasoning which says:
"Real Estate is real estate is real estate;" that is, a decision classify-
ing a thing as real estate in a certain context does not have binding
force as precedent in all other situations where the conflicting interests
are not the same. Classification as real estate may be useful in achiev-
ing a proper solution between vendor and purchaser (no other in-
terests being involved), but a personal property tag may be thought
desirable to reach the equitable result in a case involving landlord
and tenant. This possibility has long been recognized and accepted
by most judges9 and should, at this date, occasion no surprise.
Origin of Doctrine
The Pennsylvania Industrial Plant Mortgage Doctrine traces its
ancestry to the celebrated 1841 decision of Chief Justice Gibson in
Voorhis v. Freeman.° The contest was between a purchaser at a
mortgage foreclosure sale and a creditor of the mortgagor who had
levied upon certain rolls in an iron rolling mill. The levy was made
after the mortgage foreclosure sale. The rolls in dispute included
duplicates reserved for use in case of breakdowns. The purchaser
7. Conditional sales acts relating to the fixture problem were adopted in 1923
and 1925. In 1925 the Uniform Act was also adopted, and was amended in 1927.
See the Act of May 1, 1923, P.L. 117; the Act approved May 14, 1925, P.L. 722.
The Uniform Act was the Act of 'May 12, 1925, P.L. 602; and it was amended
by the Act of May 12, 1927,, P.L. 979 and later by the Act cited in note 4, supra.
8. See Arensberg, Chattel Mortgages and Industrial Plant Mortgages, 23 PA. BAR
AsS'N Q. 125 (1952) ; Robinson, McGough, and Scheinholtz, supra note 1.
9. See, e.g., Kratovil, Fixtures and the Real Estate Mortgage, 97 U. PA. L. Rev.
180, 199 (1948) referring to the different rules for determining fixtures applicable
as between landlord and tenant, as compared to those existing between mortgagor
and mortgagee by reason of "the strong policy in favor of the free removal of a
tenant's trade fixtures." The basis of such a policy would seem equally applicable
to the holder of a purchase money interest in a like fixture.
10. 2 W & S 116 (Pa. 1841).
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of the realty contended that the rolls were realty passing to him
upon the foreclosure sale, and the creditor naturally contended for a
classification of the property as personalty.
Chief Justice Gibson held that the rolls belonged to the purchaser
at the mortgage foreclosure sale. The mortgage contained the follow-
ing language referring to the mortgaged property:
"A lot or piece of ground with one iron-rolling mill establishment
situate thereon with the buildings, apparatus, steam engine, boilers,
bellows &c attached to the said establishment."
The classic and oft-quoted passage from the opinion, of course,
is where the learned Chief Justice says:
"Whether fast or loose, therefore, all the machinery of a manu-
factory necessary to constitute it, and without which it would not
be a manufactory at all, must pass for a part of the freehold. This
is no more than an enlargement of the principle of constructive
attachment. . . ." 11
Duplicate rolls, not in use, but necessary and proper for an emer-
gency, were also held to pass as realty by analogy to an earlier case
which had held that duplicate keys of a banking house passed to a pur-
chaser of the realty.
In determining why a case was decided the way it was, not only
is the language of the opinion to be carefully analyzed, but the rules
of law and the practice in other fields familiar to lawyers of the times
must be borne in mind. From the point of view of giving a money-
lender a security interest in a manufacturing establishment as a going
concern, the decision was a must. Just twenty-one years before this
time a chattel mortgage was outlawed,1" and 15 years earlier the
conditional sale was accorded like treatment.'1 With no legal basis
for mortgaging chattels, there was therefore, no way, except that
chosen by Chief Justice Gibson, in which a security interest could be
arranged so that the lien would cover the plant as a going concern.
The bailment lease, later highly developed as the only chattel security
device recognized by the common law of Pennsylvania was then in its
infancy.' 4 In any event, it, like the conditional sale, could be made
to do the job only if the financing was simultaneous with the acqui-
sition. Unfortunately, this situation was not commented on in the
opinion. Other contemporary rules of law, however, were mentioned.
11. Voorhis v. Freeman, supra note 10 at 119.
12. Glow v. Woods, 5 S & R 275 (Pa. 1819).
13. Martin v. Mathiot, 14 S & R 214 (Pa. 1826).
14. See, e.g., Clark v. Jack, 7 W & S 375 (1838).
[VOL. 4: p. 498
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A considerable passage in the opinion is devoted to the plight of
a poor cotton spinner, and his troubles with his creditors if the rule
were otherwise. In such a case, his plant could be dismembered by
separate levies upon his machinery, and it would thus, in time of
trouble, be no longer able to function as a plant and earn income. Thus,
argued the court, the owner of the cotton mill would be deprived of
the protection afforded debtors by the Pennsylvania inquisition statute. 15
This act prohibited a sale of a debtor's real estate if the rents and
profits of the land, as estimated by a sheriff's jury, would be sufficient
to pay the debt with interest in seven years.
Somewhat startling, therefore, in the light of subsequent develop-
ments, is the fact that the origin of the industrial plant doctrine lies
not only in the protection of the security of mortgage investments,
but even more in the protection of commercial debtors. Concern for
the policy of that statute may seem a bit strange today to lawyers
accustomed to "inquisition waived" clauses in every printed form.
But Chief Justice Gibson obviously felt that the rule he adopted was
necessary to keep manufacturer and farmer upon an equal plane.' 6
The court was also concerned with the confusion that might result
if the rolls were classified as chattels and so passed to an executor for
administration, while the building descended to the heir. Yet the
judge was astute enough to realize that applying the real estate label
for one purpose did not necessarily require that the label be applied
for all purposes. Significantly, the much quoted "fast or loose" passage
is immediately followed by this sentence, not usually quoted:
"I speak not here of. questions between tenant and landlord or
remainderman, but of those between vendor and vendee, heir and
executor, debtor and execution creditor, and between co-tenants
of the inheritance." 1 7
One can, of course, only speculate as to what Chief Justice Gibson
would have said of questions between a prior real property mortgagee
15. Act of June 16, 1936, P.L. 755, now the Act of June 11, 1879, P.L. 122§ 2, as amended, PA STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2382 (1951).
16. This is illustrated by the following passage from the opinion:
"In Pennsylvania, where a statute directs that real estate shall not be sold
on execution before the rents, issues, and profits, shall have been found by an
inquest insufficient to satisfy the debt in seven years, not only might this con-
servative provision be evaded, but a cotton spinner, for instance, whose capital
is chiefly invested in loose machinery, might be suddenly broken up in the midst
of a thriving business, by suffering a creditor to gut his mill of everything
which happened not to be spiked and riveted to the walls, and sell its bowels
not only separately but piecemeal." Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 W & S 116, 119
(Pa. 1841).
17. Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 W & S 116, 119 (Pa. 1841).
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and the holder of a perfected purchase money interest in a chattel
thereafter affixed to the realty or used in an industrial plant. It seems
clear enough, however, that he would have recognized that different
policy considerations were operating in such a case and that he would
have attacked the problem in the light of those considerations.
Early Cases
Let us, then, trace the subsequent development of the rule of
Voorhis v. Freeman to see the various applications of the doctrine.
In the same year in which Voorhis was decided, the doctrine
was reiterated in Pyle v. Pennock, "s where the property was not only
rolls not in place in a rolling mill, but certain iron plates held in place
by their own weight on the floor of a bar-iron mill. The contest was
between a voluntary assignee for creditors and a purchaser of the
realty at a subsequent sheriff's sale under a mortgage. Applying the
"part of the freehold" classification, the purchaser of the realty
prevailed.
Eleven years later the court was faced with the contention that
a mortgage of the Emmaline Furnace made when it was run by water
power, did not cover a subsequently installed steam engine, boiler,
bellows and other equipment, paid for in full by the mortgagor. The
machinery was attached by bolts to bed plates in the walls and could
be removed by backing the nuts off the bolts.'9
The contending parties here, however, were a second mortgagee
and the mortgagor's brother who obtained a judgment against the
mortgagor. The mortgagor gave his creditor-brother a bill of sale
to the steam power plant, and his brother removed the power plant
from the furnace. To the contention that since this machinery had
been installed long after the mortgage was given, it could be removed
without doing any wrong to the mortgagee, the court said:
"But this is not so. As the mortgagee may suffer by the deprecia-
tion of the property, arising from fluctuations in value, from
accident, and from neglect, so he may be benefited by its apprecia-
tion, whether the same arises from the proper cultivation and
improvement of the property, or from any other cause. No other
rule would be at all practical." 20
The quoted passage, however, relates to property bought and paid for
by the mortgagor, and therefore does not necessarily apply to the
18. 2 W & S 390 (Pa. 1841).
19. Roberts v. Dauphin Deposit Bank, 19 Pa. 71 (1852).
20. Roberts v. Dauphin Deposit Bank, supra note 19 at 76.
[VOL. 4: p. 498
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perfected security interest of an unpaid conditional vendor of a chattel
affixed to the realty.
In 1857 Christian v. Dripps was decided.21 Aside from its being
a case not involving a rolling mill, the issues and decision conformed
to prior law. The fact that a lathe had been contributed to the plant
by one becoming a partner after the mortgage was placed did not
prevent the mortgage lien from attaching to it, nor did the fact the
lathe was but seldom used. Johnson v. Mehaffey, 2 in 1862, again
focuses our attention on rolling mills. Here the rolls had been pur-
chased for the mill and had been delivered to it some three years be-
fore the transaction arose but had never been turned down, fitted to
the mill or actually used in the mill. The court, basing its holding
on the fact of no prior use in the mill, held that the rolls retained
their character as chattels. The contest was between a purchaser of
the rolling mill and an execution creditor of the former owner. The
court said:
"A very provident man is quite sure to have on hand materials
which he sees will some time be necessary for the repair of his
works, or for supplying deficiencies in them; but his having them
with this intention does not make them constitutent parts of his
works. Thus he will provide extra saws for a saw mill, or bolting
cloth for a flour mill, or extra castings for the running gear, or
lumber, nails, screws, and other materials to make improvements
or repairs; but this prudence does not convert personal into real
property, so long as the fact remains that they are not yet made
constituent elements of the mill, or other structure. This fact we
can ascertain and define with reasonable certainty, but we can have
no measure for the ever-varying degrees of prudent forethought." 28
Not until Hill v. Sewald,24 in 1867, do we find a case involving
a conflict between the holder of a recognized interest in chattels, and
the holder of a prior mortgage upon the plant in which the chattels
were used. The facts are not without interest. Sewald held a pur-
chase money mortgage on a steam powered sawmill he had sold to
one Snodgrass who, shortly after his purchase, joined the "Boys in
Blue." While he was at war, the boilers he left behind him burned
out, and his wife, to keep the mill fires burning, leased substitute
boilers from Hill at a rental of four dollars a month, Hill reserving the
right to remove the boilers at his pleasure. The court stated that the
21. 28 Pa. 271 (1857).
22. 43 Pa. 308 (1862).
23. Johnson v. Mehaffey, supra note 22 at 309. The desire for a simple, easily
administered rule appears not to have lingered in the law, however.
24. 53 Pa. 271 (1867).
SUMMER 1959]
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boilers "could be removed without any other injury than taking down
the boiler wall, which was built of brick and stood under a shed out-
side of the mill."
When Snodgrass came home again, he affirmed his wife's con-
tract but was unable to keep up the payments on his mortgage. Sewald
foreclosed. At the foreclosure sale Hill read a notice claiming title
to the boilers. When Sewald refused to give them up, Hill brought
an action of trover.
Although the lower court entered a judgment n.o.v. against him,
Hill prevailed in the supreme court. The court's analysis was that
when Hill severed the boilers from his own sawmill they became
chattels in his hands. As such they came onto the land of Snodgrass,
and until permanently annexed to the freehold the prior real estate
mortgagee could have no interest therein. According to the court,
the issue was the intention with which the chattels were placed on
the real estate for use with the mill. In determining intention the
court was obviously not seeking to determine the mental processes
of Mrs. Snodgrass, but to weigh the conflicting interests of the lessor,
the owner and the mortgagee. The decision represents, therefore, a
determination that the interest of the lessor outweighed the interest
of the mortgagee.
In 1868, therefore, the court saw no insuperable difficulty in
holding that machinery forming a part of a manufactory was protected
from seizure on execution by general creditors because considered
as real estate, and therefore subject to the lien of a mortgage; and
at the same time, preserving the interest of a lessor of machinery, by
rejecting the claim of a mortgagee that the machinery had become real
estate and thus subject to the mortgage lien in preference to the lessor's
reversion. While the decision was couched in terms of the "intent"
with which the chattels were affiliated with the realty, it seems ines-
capable that the lessor's reservation of his rights to remove the leased
chattel was a factor influencing the finding as to the owner's intent, at
the time of affixation, not to make a permanent addition to the realty.
Bailment Lease Cases
From the Civil War to the depression of the 1930's, the interest
of one denominated as a lessor, even though only a bailment-lessor,
seemed to prevail. In Collins v. Bellefonte Central R.R. Co.,2" in 1895,
25. 171 Pa. 243, 33 At. 331 (1895).
[VOL. 4: p. 498
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the interest of a lessor of locomotives prevailed over the purchaser
at the sheriff's sale under a prior real property mortgage covering the
railroad and its rolling stock. The mortgage contained a very broad
after acquired property clause. At the sheriff's sale Collins, the lessor
who was a substantial stockholder in the railroad, read a notice of
his interest. The locomotive was used by the railroad under a lease
containing an option to purchase. If the option were exercised all
prior rentals would be applied on the purchase price. In other words,
the property was held on bailment lease. The court permitted the
lessor to recover in replevin even though the lease had not been filed
as provided in the railroad equipment statute.
The significant passages .of the opinion were:
"... [T] here was abundant proof in the case that Collins was the
actual owner of the property claimed by him on his writ; ... [I]t
never was property 'acquired' by the railroad company under
the description in the mortgage, unless acquired by the lease
from Collins; and the Company up until after the sale on the
mortgage never pretended to assert possession in hostility to
Collins' title. Nor if notice to the purchaser at that sale was
given, as is uncontradicted, would the Act of 1883 operate to
divest his title .... ,, 26
Thus, the court had no difficulty in disposing of a mortgagee's claim
based, not only on the doctrines of accessions or fixtures, but also on
the terms of an after acquired property clause. Furthermore, since
the case involved a railroad, statutory authority to mortgage chattels
as well as the realty existed27 so that a classification of realty was not
necessary in order to spread the lien of the mortgage to the locomo-
tive. Yet the court adopts the conventional approach that the mort-
gage only attached to the railroad's interest in the property, subject
to the perfected rights of others therein at the time of acquisition by
the railroad company.2"
Two years later, a federal court sitting in Pennsylvania, applied
Pennsylvania law to a bailment lease of a refrigeration plant in a
brewery, even as against a subsequent mortgagee without notice of
the lease.29
A decade later, in a case involving a bailment lease of boilers
to a tenant operating a paper plant on leased premises, the court had
26. Collins v. Bellefonte Central R.R. Co., supra note 25, 171 Pa. at 257, 33
Atl. at 333.
27. See the Act of June 12, 1878, P.L. 183 and particularly the preamble thereof.
28. See, e.g., Note, Defeating the Priority of an After Acquired Property Clause,
48 HARV. L. REv. 474 (1935).
29. Case v. L'Oeble, 84 Fed. 582 (E.D. Pa. 1897).
SUMMER 1959]
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 4 [1959], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol4/iss4/2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
no difficulty in protecting the bailment lessor's right to remove the
boilers as against the contention of the mortgagee of the landlord
that the boilers were realty subject to his mortgage lien. Wetherill v.
Gallagher,8" the case so deciding, is also significant because the boilers
obtained on bailment lease replaced old boilers which the tenant had
removed. The court refused to condition the bailment lessor's right
of removal upon the filing of an undertaking to replace the old boilers
which were still lying on an adjoining lot. The ground for this re-
fusal was that the bailment lessor had not participated in the removal,
and the mortgagee's action for waste lay only against the tenant.
In 1925 the court decided a replevin action against the purchaser
at a bankruptcy sale of the Giles Manufacturing Company, brought
by a salesman of the bankrupt who had purchased and paid for fifteen
knitting machines and leased them to the bankrupt knitting mill under
a bailment lease.8 1 The court permitted the bailment lessor to re-
cover, even though the bailment lease contract was not reduced to
writing until two weeks after the knitting mill was in possession of
the machines and notwithstanding the fact that the machines were
consigned directly to the knitting mill by the machinery manufacturer.
The machines were, however, marked with the salesman's name as
owner and lessor, and there was no question but that he had paid
for them.
It apparently did not occur to anyone connected with the case, in-
cluding the justices of the court, that it was worth arguing, as against
a bailment lessor, that the machines had become realty and passed with
the sale of the real estate free of the chattel interest of the bailment
lessor.
When the point was later argued in 1932, in American Laundry
Machinery Co. v. Miners Trust Co. of Nanticoke,2 the result was the
same. This case involved two bailment leases of laundry machinery
to a commercial laundry, one made before and one after the laundry
company placed a mortgage on its land and buildings. The bailment
lease device was, of course, valid as against creditors without recorda-
tion or filing. The mortgagee contended that the machinery had be-
come real estate under Voorhis v. Freeman. The lower Court, how-
ever, found to the contrary, based upon the terms of the bailment
lease and the fact that the machinery was either held in place by its
own weight, or was screwed or bolted in place, so that removal was
30. 217 Pa. 635, 66 Atd. 849 (1907).
31. Schmidt v. Bader, 284 Pa. 41, 130 At. 259 (1925).
32. 307 Pa. 395, 161 At!. 306 (1932).
[VOL. 4: p. 498
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possible without physical injury to the structure. On appeal, the de-
cision was affirmed in an opinion of several pages citing several cases,
but denominated per curiam 83
Other Applications
The doctrine of Voorhis v. Freeman, during this period flourished
in other contexts, however. 4  It was applied, in Ege v. Kille, 5 to
permit an innocent trespasser to offset, against a claim for mesne
profits, the value of the permanent improvements made by him dur-
ing his occupancy including machinery that became a part of the
realty. Two years later the court held as against general creditors
that the vendor's purchase money mortgage covered machinery, even
though to convey the property the parties used both a deed and a bill
of sale. 8 In one amusing case just before the turn of the century a
creditor's levy on steam radiators was permitted to prevail over the
claim of the mortgagee. The latter prevailed as to the pipes in the
walls. The court said:
"That a steam-heating apparatus is indispensable to the occupancy
and enjoyment of a dwelling house as such cannot be pretended.
... That as a means of heating dwellings it may in a short time
be superseded by something superior to it seems but a reasonable
expectation." 17
Titus v. Poland Coal Company,38 another trespasser case, required the
trespasser to pay to the landowner the value of an electric fan and
motor he had removed from colliery buildings after a final ejectment
order.
Thus, prior to the depression of the 1930's, with but one minor
exception in a lower court, 9 the bailment lessor's interest was preferred
33. The full report is three and two third pages long, cites six cases, and in view of
the full discussion in the briefs, to this writer appears to be a considered opinion on the
point. See note 80 infra.
34. These were, chiefly, cases between the mortgagee and the interests of a
creditor of the mortgagor seeking to levy upon assets of his debtor.
35. 84 Pa. 333 (1877).
36. Morris' Appeal, 88 Pa. 368 (1879). The significance of the argument from
the bill of sale lies in the verbal dogma that the touchstone of decision was the
intent of the parties. What more obvious expression of an intention in favor of
personalty than the selection of a bill of sale to convey the machinery? Obviously,
therefore, verbal dogma does not control.
37. National Bank of Catasaqua v. North, 160 Pa. 303, 28 Atl. 694 (1894).
38. 275 Pa. 431, 119 Atl. 540 (1923).
39. Marx v. Perrus, 10 Pa. D & C 175 (C.P. West. 1927). The contest was
between a bailment lessor to a tenant and the real estate mortgagee. The Court
refused to give a judgment on the pleadings for the bailment lessor of a heater,
a bath tub, sink, toilets and lavatories. The Court ruled that a trial was necessary
to determine the method of affixation and whether or not the items became real
estate.
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over that of the prior real property mortgagee. It now remains to con-
sider the fate of the conditional vendor whose contract was originally
regarded as a fraudulent device.
Conditional Sale Cases
In 1906, before any statutory protection was given him, a condi-
tional vendor prevailed over the prior real property mortgagee as to
"engines and fixtures for the purpose of generating electric light and
power" in an amusement park. At the time of installation the park
property was subject to a mortgage containing an after acquired
property clause securing an issue of bonds. At the receiver's sale
the conditional vendor gave notice of his claim. The court, in Wickes
Bros. v. Island Park Ass'n4° permitted recovery by the conditional
vendor, saying:
"A purchaser at the receiver's sale, with notice, or a holder of
bonds secured by a mortgage given before the machinery was
sold, had no higher right than the association."
A few years later, in Bullock Electric Manufacturing Co. v. Lehigh
Valley Traction Co.,4 a similar issue arose involving a conditional
sale of electric generators to a street railway company. The generators
were installed in the company's power plant, replacing generators in-
stalled with bondholders money obtained from the first mortgage bonds
of the company. Removal could be effected with but slight physical
damage. There was still no statute validating conditional sales and,
therefore, a judgment creditor's levy on the generators, if they were
classified as personalty, would have come ahead of the interest of the
conditional vendor.
The action before the court was replevin by the conditional vendor
against the federal equity receivers operating the street railway. The
court applied the Voorhis v. Freeman doctrine to spread the lien of
the mortgage to the generating equipment. Another ground for the
decision was that, the corporation being insolvent, the federal equity
receivers appointed on behalf of the bondholders had the rights of a
levying creditor and so prevailed over the conditional vendor.42 Finally,
in disregard of the standard bailment lease practice, the court said
40. 229 Pa. 400, 78 Atl. 934 (1906).
41. 231 Pa. 129, 80 Atl. 568 (1911).
42. Apparently the law of Pennsylvania gives the receiver of an insolvent corpora-
tion the rights of a levying creditor, but a receiver for a solvent but embarassed
corporation has no higher rights than the corporation he represents.
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that replevin was not the proper form of action as the generators had
become realty.
Between Wickes and Bullock two points of distinction can be made.
Electric lighting could not have been considered as essential to an
amusement park in 1906 as electric power was to a street railway.
But what of power for the amusement park's machines? Then, the
contending parties were different. In Wickes the issue was between
the conditional vendor and a purchaser at a sheriff's sale under a mort-
gage, and in Bullock the issue was between the conditional vendor and
federal equity receivers who represented general creditors and had, un-
der applicable Pennsylvania law, the rights of an execution creditor.
The court, therefore, had the choice of reversing a long line of prece-
dent holding in favor of levying creditors against the conditional ven-
dor, or of reaching the very result contended for in Voorhis v. Free-
man, namely, spreading the lien of the mortgage to machinery so as
to prevent levying creditors from effecting a piecemeal dismember-
ment of the plant.
In 1915 a general conditional sales act was passed,43 and shortly
thereafter the conditional vendor to a mining company of a motor
generator set having a value of $4,300 found his claim to priority
over his vendee's landlord, and the landlord's mortgagee, before the
court.44 The set was installed by the tenant as a part of his obligation
under the lease to install some $50,000 of improvements, to become
the landlord's property. The conditional sale contract was duly re-
corded under the Act of 1915. The landlord and his mortgagee con-
tended for priority on the ground that the generator set had become
realty. The court agreed with this contention, conceding that in ordi-
nary circumstances the doctrine of Titus v. Poland Coal Co. and allied
cases would apply.45 Notwithstanding this concession, however, the
43. Act of June 17, 1915, P.L. 866. The language relating to chattels affixed
to the realty reads as follows:
"Every such contract for the conditional sale of any goods or chattels, at-
tached or to be attached to any real property or chattels real, shall be void as
against subsequent bona fide purchasers, or encumbrances of such real property
or chattel real, without notice, and as to them the sale shall be deemed absolute
unless such contract shall have been recorded and indexed, as herein provided,
before such goods or chattels are so attached, or before the date of such purchase
or encumbrance of such real estate or chattel real.
"Except as above provided, said goods or chattels shall not, by reason of
their being attached to any real property or chattels real, become an accession
thereto; but shall be treated as severable, and subject to removal as against the
conditional vendee, his heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns,
and also as against all other persons having any interest in or liens against
such real property or chattels real, upon the tender of a sufficient bond to all
such persons holding prior interest in or liens against the same, conditioned for
repairing all damage caused by such severance and removal".
44. Ridgway Dynamo & Elec. Co. v. Werder, 287 Pa. 358, 135 At. 216 (1926).
45. See supra note 39.
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holding was in favor of the conditional vendor who had complied
with the terms of the 1915 Act. The statute was also held constitu-
tional against the contention that it was special legislation changing
the method of collecting debts and providing a new type of lien."
In its language relating to the fixture problem the wording of
the 1915 conditional sales act is strikingly similar to the wording of
Section 9-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code which governs the
problem today,47 and about which more must be said later. One can,
of course, only speculate as to what future cases would have held had
the statutory language remained unchanged. The subsequent statutes
injected a test based upon a verbal formula of removal "without ma-
terial injury to the freehold," 48 and thereby gave judges, learned in
the law that deemed conditional sales a fraudulent device to be striken
down wherever possible, an excuse to continue to discriminate against
the conditional sale.
A legislative oversight provided the first opportunity and fore-
shadowed the events to come. The 1925 legislature adopted two
conditional sales acts, which were signed by the Governor two days
apart. One was the Uniform Act,49 and the other a modification of
46. PA. CONST. art. 3 § 7.
47. Compare the wording of the 1915 Act set forth in note 43 supra, with the
provisions of Section 9-313 of the UNIFORM COMMARCIAL CODE, as follows:
"(1) When under other rules of law goods are so affixed or related to
the realty as to be a part thereof, a security interest in such goods which
attaches before they become part of the realty takes priority as to such goods
over the claims of all persons who have an interest in the realty except
(a) a subsequent purchaser for value of any interest in the realty; or
(b) a subsequent judgment creditor with a lien on the realty; or
(c) a prior encumbrancer of the realty to the extent that he makes subse-
quent advances provided that the purchaser or lien creditor becomes such or the
prior encumbrancer makes such advances without knowledge of the security
interest and before its perfection. A purchaser of the realty at a foreclosure
sale is a subsequent purchaser within this Section unless he was the prior en-
cumbrancer."
48. This was first injected in the Act of May 1, 1923, P.L. 117, where the
priority provisions (§ 2) read as follows:
"Third. As against a prior mortgagee or other prior encumbrancer of the
realty, who has not assented to the reservation of property in the chattels, if
any of the chattels are so attached to the realty as not to be severable without
material injury to the freehold, the reservation of property in the chattels
so attached shall be void, notwithstanding the filing of the contract or state-
ment, unless such injury, although material, be such as can be completely
repaired, and the seller before retaking such chattels furnishes or tenders
to such prior mortgagee or encumbrancer a good and sufficient bond conditioned
for the immediate making of such repairs. 'Prior,' as used in this paragraph,
refers to the time of attaching the chattels to the realty."
49. Act of May 12, 1925, P.L. 602. As at first adopted, Section 7 provided:
"If the goods are so affixed to realty at the time of a conditional sale
or subsequently as to become a part thereof and not to be severable wholly
or in any portion without material injury to the freehold, the reservation of
property as to any portion not so severable shall be void after the goods are so
affixed, as against any person who has not expressly assented to the reservation
. . . (Balance of section relates to situation where goods are severable
without material injury.)
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the Act of 1923 applying to conditional sales of goods affixed to the
realty.5"
Beloit Iron Works v. Lockhardt5' involved the rights of a condi-
tional vendor of a so-called "cylinder machine" to a paper mill, and a
receiver of the insolvent paper mill who had, therefore, the rights
of a levying creditor. The conditional vendor had not filed his contract.
The court disposed of the Uniform Act by holding that, as passed,
it did not apply since the definition of "goods" excluded goods affixed
to the realty. How the express provisions of Section 7 of the Uniform
Act relating to the problem were to be construed, the court did not say.
Passing to the Act of May 14, 1925, the court also held that it
had no provision applicable to the instant case. Section 3 of that statute
did provide that the contract of conditional sale "shall be filed" and
voided unfiled contracts as to "subsequent mortgagees, or other sub-
sequent encumbrancers," but did not expressly mention a receiver or
a levying creditor. Neglecting what, to the writer, appears the obvious
solution, viz., that the term "subsequent encumbrancer" was broad
enough to include receivers and levying creditors, the court expounded
upon the theme that a statute changing one of the common law rules
"will not be extended by interpretation to make any further innova-
tion thereon than as expressly declared in or with reasonable certainty
to be implied from the Act itself." 52
The 1927 Legislature had, of course, promptly corrected the
1925 oversight,58 but this was after the facts in Beloit arose and could,
therefore, be ignored by the 1928 court.
50. Act of May 14, 1925, P.L. 722. The severance provisions here were identical
with those of the Act of 1923, supra note 48. Note the emphasis against protecting
the conditional vendor as compared with the emphasis in favor of the chattel security
interest in the 1915 Act, supra note 43.
51. 294 Pa. 376, 144 Atl. 283 (1928).
52. Beloit Iron Works v. Lockhardt, supra note 51, 294 Pa. at 383, 144 Atl.
at 285.
53. Act of May 12, 1927, P.L. 979. This Act changed the wording of the
definition of goods, and amended Section 7 to read as follows:
"First. As against a subsequent purchaser, subsequent mortgagee, or other
subsequent encumbrancer of the realty, for value and without notice of the
reservation of property in the goods, such reservation shall be void as to any
goods so attached to the realty as to form a part thereof, unless the conditional
sales contract, or a copy thereof, shall be filed, as required in section six, before
such purchase is made or such mortgage is given or such encumbrance is
effected. 'Subsequent,' as used in this paragraph, refers to the time. of attach-
ing the goods to the realty.
"Second. As against an owner, a prior mortgagee, or other prior en-
cumbrancer of the realty, who has not assented to the reservation of property
in the goods, if any of the goods are so attached to the realty as not to be
severable without material injury to the freehold, the reservation of property
in the goods so attached shall be void, notwithstanding the filing of the con-
tract or a copy thereof, unless such injury, although material, be such as can be
completely repaired, and the seller, before retaking such goods, furnishes or
tenders to such owner, prior mortgagee, or encumbrancer, a good and sufficient
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Background Cases on Fixtures
Before considering in detail the cases under the 1925 and sub-
sequent conditional sales legislation, two additional and oft-cited back-
ground cases must be discussed.
The first of these cases was Commonwealth Trust Co. of Pitts-
burgh v. Harkins,54 decided in 1933. The contest was between the
federal equity receivers of an embarrassed but solvent corporation,
and the holder of a second mortgage. The actual petition before the
court was brought by the receivers to set aside a sale on foreclosure
of the mortgage of certain tools, jigs, dies and machinery included
in the sale as realty.
One unusual facet to the normal situation was present here. The
machinery, tools, jigs and dies, except for their scrap value, and pos-
sibly except for expensive alterations, were suitable only for the manu-
facture of patented articles. The patents were not covered by the
mortgage, and so passed to the receivers. The receivers argued that
the mortgagee and any purchaser could not use the machinery, jigs
and dies and so these items should be held to pass with the patents.
The court, evidently feeling that a deadlock would force a compromise
beneficial to all, ruled otherwise, saying:
"We think the facts that the machines are removable without
injury to the property, and that the patterns, jigs and dies were
made solely for the purpose of manufacturing patented machinery
and the patents are owned and controlled by the printing com-
pany, if admitted, do not take them out from under the lien of
the mortgage in view of the rules which have been laid down
by us in a number of cases and which, accordingly, have become
rules of property ... 
However, the so-called "rule of property" did not prevent the
court from envisaging a different result in other situations, as the
court also said:
"This is not the case of the mortgaging of a bare piece of
land and the erection of a building thereon by a subsequent pur-
chaser of the land. Nor is it the case of the erection of a build-
bond conditioned for the immediate making of such repairs. 'Prior,' as used
in this paragraph, refers to the time of attaching the chattels to the realty.
"Third. In order to entitle the conditional sale contract or copy thereof,
referred to in this section, to be filed and indexed, it shall have endorsed thereon
or attached thereto, a statement, signed by the seller, briefly describing the
realty, and stating that the goods are, or are to be, affixed thereto."
54. 312 Pa. 402, 167 Atd. 278 (1933).
-55. Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Harkins, supra note 54, 312 Pa. at 406, 167
Atl. at 279-80.
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ing on land and the mortgaging of land and building and the
subsequent bringing into the building of machinery for temporary
use as in Vail v. Weaver, 132 Pa. 363, or under bailment lease
as in American Laundry Machine Co. v. Miners Trust Company,
307 Pa. 395. .. ." 56
The second of the two cases is Clayton v. Lienhard.5 7 Here a
sprinkler system was installed under a bailment lease at the time a
building was being erected. The owner of the realty and the bailment
lessor agreed, in the bailment lease contract, that the system should
remain personal property and be subject to removal. The owner de-
faulted on an early installment, and the bailment lessor filed a me-
chanics lien against the building. The defaulting owner made three
arguments against the filing of a mechanics lien. First, he argued
that the sprinkler system was not a proper subject for a mechanics
lien; second, that no title to the sprinkler system had passed to the
owner and so no lien could be filed, and, finally, that the specific agree-
ment that the system remain personal property operated as a waiver
of the right to file a mechanics lien. The court, obviously sympathetic
to the installer, held against the defaulting owner of the building on
all points. One holding was that the bailment lease agreement was a
contract of additional security, and that the installer had not thereby
waived any other legal remedies he might have.
To sustain the bailment lessor's right to file a mechanics lien,
the court, in an opinion that has become a landmark in the Pennsyl-
vania law of fixtures, divided chattels or goods in some way relating
to the realty into the three following classes:5s
1. Those articles that are manifestly furniture and are not
peculiarly fitted to the property with which they are used. These
always remain personalty.59
2. Those which are so affixed to the realty that they cannot
be removed without material injury to themselves and to the
real estate itself. These articles become real estate despite the
intent of the parties.60
56. Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Harkins, supra note 54, 312 Pa. at 409, 167 Atl.
at 281. The reference to the American Laundry Machine Co. case has significance
in view of the subsequent cavalier treatment of that case in the Eatmor Chocolate Co.
cases, see infra note 79.
57. 312 Pa. 433, 167 Atl. 321 (1933).
58. Clayton v. Lienhard, supra note 57, 312 Pa. at 436-37, 167 Atl. at 322.
59. For this class the court cited Vaughn v. Haldeman, 33 Pa. 522 (1859) (gas-
fixtures, such as chandeliers and side-brackets), and Jarechi v. Philaharmonic Society,
79 Pa. 403 (1875) (gas-fixtures). Cf. Klaus v. Majestic Apartment House Co., 250
Pa. 194, 95 Atl. 451 (1915) (hotel furniture).
60. For this class the court referred to the pipes in the walls of the house in
Bank v. North, 160 Pa. 303, 28 Atd. 694 (1894), to Harmony Bldg. Ass'n v. Berger,
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3. Those which, although physically connected with real
estate, are so affixed as to be removable without destroying or
materially injuring the chattels themselves or the property to
which they are annexed; these become part of the realty or re-
main personalty depending upon the intention of the parties at
the time of the annexation; in this class fall such chattels as
boilers and machinery affixed to realty for the use of an owner
or tenant but readily removable."'
The court next turned to an examination of the particular sprinkler
system then before it. Since the system had been planned as an in-
tegral part of the original construction, with pipes buried in the floor
and walls, it was quickly placed in the second class, thus vindicating
the installer's action in filing his mechanics lien against the entire
building. Such a holding, the court concluded, did not stultify or
render unenforceable the contract of bailment lease. As between the
parties, the court said that the owner can grant the right to sever
a part of the realty, and upon severance it will become personalty. 2
Thus the installer of the sprinkler system could have his cake
and eat it too. He could treat the sprinkler as realty and file his me-
chanics lien, or he could, if the time for mechanics lien filing had
elapsed, exercise his contract right to sever and reconvert to personalty.
Or could he? What about the lien of a prior real property mortgage?
Summary of Law Before Eatmor Cases
At this point, in view of the cases we next must consider, it may
be advisable to summarize briefly the cases we have discussed. Voorhis
v. Freeman introduced the so-called industrial plant mortgage doctrine
as a rule applying between mortgagee and levying creditor, as much to
ensure the benefit of the inquisition statute to mill owners as for any
other policy. The opinion expressly recognized that a different rule
would apply between landlord and tenant. The rule was applied in
99 Pa. 320 (1882), to a Kentucky case as to a coal tipple and to a Massachusetts case
as to a house. Later the court cited Kinnear v. Scenic Railways Co., 223 Pa. 390,
72 Atl. 809 (1909) (scenic railway structure as part of existing building), In re
Morrison, Jones, Taylor, Ltd., 1 Ch. 50 (1914), and also cases from Arkansas,
California, Delaware, Iowa, and New York.
61. For this class the court cited American Laundry Machinery Co. v. Miners
Trust Co., 307 Pa. 395, 161 At. 306 (1932) (Here again the reference to this case
gives no indication of the subsequent cavalier treatment to be accorded it. See infra
note 79.) ; Ridgway D & E Co. v. Werder, 287 Pa. 358, 135 Atl. 216 (1926)
Bullock Electric Mfg. Co. v. Lehigh Traction Co., 231 Pa. 129, 80 Atl. 568 (1911)
Wickes Bros. v. Island Park Ass'n, 229 Pa. 400, 78 Atl. 934 (1911); Wick v.
Bredin, 189 Pa. 83, 42 Atl. 17 (1899) ; Hill v. Sewald, 53 Pa. 271 (1867) ; Harlan
v. Harlan, 20 Pa. 303 (1853); Shell v. Haywood & Snyder, 16 Pa. 523 (1851)
and White's Appeal, 10 Pa. 252 (1849).
62. Clayton v. Lienhard, supra note 58, 312 Pa. at 438-39, 167 At. at 323.
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many situations, but in the case of a conflict between a prior mortgagee
and the bailment lessor of machinery, the court consistently favored
the only recognized form of chattel security, the interest of the bail-
ment lessor.6
The verbal formulae found in the opinions to the effect that the
issues are resolved according to the "intention of the parties" or be-
cause of affixation for a "temporary purpose," of course are not tests
that are of any real validity64 when the issue involves the rights of
a prior real property mortgagee who has no part in the acquisition
of the chattel. The intent, even the so-called objective intent gathered
from actions and not from contractual declarations, of vendor and
vendee of the chattel should not affect the rights of the mortgagee.
The real issue should be a frank weighing of the policies to be served
by a decision in favor of the prior mortgagee, or his successors, and
the policies to be served by a decision favoring the holder of a pur-
chase money interest in the new machinery.
The Eatmor Chocolate Co. Cases
These conflicting interests first held the stage under the 1925
Act in a case involving theatre seats sold to a theatre on conditional
sale in 1930 with the contract properly filed under the Uniform Act
as amended by the 1927 amendment.65 The real property mortgage
was placed in 1923. The mortgagee had bid the property in at the
sheriff's sale and had sold the property to the defendant in the action
of replevin brought by the conditional vendor. The court applied the
Conditional Sales Act literally and ruled against the purchaser of the
63. See Hill v. Sewald, supra note 24, Collins v. Bellefonte Central R.R. Co.,
supra note 25, Wetherill v. Gallagher, supra note 30, Case v. L'Oeble, supra note
29, Schmidt v. Bader, supra note 31, American Laundry Machinery Co. v. Miners
Trust Co., supra note .32, and cf. Moller, Inc. v. Mainker, 314 Pa. 314, 171 Atd. 476
(1933).
64. The basic issue is whether the policy of favoring subsequent purchase money
financing is to prevail, or the policy of increasing the security of the prior mortgage
is to be favored. Yet cases have gone to the jury under instructions to find the
"intention" of the mortgagor at the time of affixation of the chattel. See, e.g.,
Benedict v. Marsh, 127 Pa. 309, 18 Atl. 26 (1889) (character of engine, boiler, and
machinery, bolted to blocks, set in ground, purchased and attached after judgment
lien attached to land is for jury and evidence of intent to purchase as a portable
saw mill is admissible). Cf. In re Ginsberg, 255 F.2d 358 (3d Cir. 1958) (evidence
of intention not relevant where no showing that intention existed at time of affixation) ;
cf. also Albert v. Ulrich, 180 Pa. 283, 36 Atl. 745 (1897) (mill owned by wife,
operated by husband, but not as tenant, and machinery admittedly was removable
by tenant as trade fixture, but as husband was not tenant, it was presumed he "in-
tended" a gift to his wife, for, as it turned out, the benefit of the mortgagee).
On analysis, is not the policy favoring removal of trade fixtures by a tenant, a
vote in favor of a policy of modernization and a vote favoring the one whose money
purchased the machinery?
65. National Theatre Supply Co. v. Mishler Theatre Co., 312 Pa. 250, 167 Atl.
324 (1933).
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realty, because he was a subsequent purchaser against whom the statute
preferred the interest of the conditional vendor. The court also stated
that its decision was consistent with its ruling in Clayton v. Lienhard.66
Thus, when properly protected by statute, the conditional vendor
prevailed over the prior mortgagee under the 1915 Act and again
under the 1927 statute. Or so the cases at this point would lead one
to believe. And, as we have seen, the bailment lessor also prevailed.
The court was next faced with five appeals arising out of the
financial embarrassment of a chocolate candy company called the
Eatmor Chocolate Company. 7 Perhaps the ensuing difficulties were
caused by the fact that the court heard simultaneously two cases in-
volving conflicts between the prior mortgagee and receivers repre-
senting general creditors and three cases involving conflicts between
the prior mortgagee and conditional vendors, but more probably the
trouble was with the language of the 1925 and 1927 versions of the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act, which had departed from the crisp,
clear language of the 1915 statute and had introduced the statutory
test of removability "without material injury to the freehold," or if
the injury were material, but was capable of being completely repaired,
then the conditional vendor's right of removal was conditioned upon
the giving of a bond to reimburse the prior mortgagee for the cost
of necessary repairs."
In the Eatmor cases involving the conflict between the mortgagee
and the receivers for a solvent, but embarrassed corporation, 9 the
lower court held, on the authority of prior industrial plant mortgage
cases that the mortgagee prevailed. This holding was affirmed almost
entirely on the lower court's opinion, with an added reference to the
Bullock decision.70
In the cases involving conditional sales, all of which involved
various failures to comply with the requirements of Section 7 of the
66. See supra note 57.
67. Mortgagees v. Receivers: Pennsylvania Chocolate Co. for use of Common-
wealth Trust Co. v. Hershey Bros. (now named Eatmor Chocolate Co.), 316 Pa. 292,
175 Atl. 694 (1934); Pennsylvania Chocolate Company, etc. v. Hershey Bros.
(Appeal of Commonwealth Trust Co.), 316 Pa. 315, 175 At. 703 (1934).
Mortgagees v. Conditional Vendors: Central Lithograph Co. v. Eatmor Chocolate
Co. (Appeal of Eline's, Inc.), 316 Pa. 300, 175 Atl. 697 (1934) (the main opinion).
Ibid (Appeal of Ball Ice Machine Co.), 316 Pa. 312, 175 Atl. 701 (1934) ; Ibid
(Appeal of Minneapolis Securities Corp.), 316 Pa. 310, 175 Atl. 702 (1934).
68. See supra notes 48, 49, and 50.
69. In Pennsylvania, the rights of a receiver for a solvent but embarrassed
corporation are apparently no greater than those of the corporation itself. The
receiver for an insolvent corporation has, however, the rights of a levying creditor.
70. Central Lithograph Co. v. Eatmor Chocolate Co., supra note 67, 316 Pa. at
300, 175 Atl. at 697.
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Conditional Sales Act,7 the lower court ruled in favor of the condi-
tional vendor in two of the cases, both involving candy machines
removable with but slight physical damage to the realty, although
responsible for one half, in one instance, and one third, in the other,
of the factory's candy output. 72 In the case of a refrigeration machine,
ammonia condenser and motors pertaining thereto, where the cost
of removal would exceed $2,000 and the machinery had been rather
completely integrated with the former machinery, the lower court's
ruling was in favor of the mortgagee.73
In the candy machinery cases, the lower court held that the ease
of physical removal took the cases out of Section 7, and that, there-
fore, a prior mortgagee had no standing to complain of a failure to
file under the act. The lower court rejected the mortgagee's conten-
tion that the statutory words "severable without material injury to
the freehold" meant "severable without diminishing the productive
capacity of the plant," stating: "If the mortgagee's theory were to
be adopted, no vendor could make an effective conditional sale with
any purchaser whose plant was mortgaged."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, thought otherwise,
saying:
"To give the language used the meaning for which appellee
contends and to which the lower court assented would be to
change our common law, and 'a change in the common law
cannot be presumed; it must appear to have been meant, or it
will be held not to have been made.' . . ." 7
To determine what the common law meant by "the freehold,"
the court quoted at length from Voorhis v. Freeman, and Common-
wealth Trust Co. v. Harkins,75 without indicating that the issues there
involved were between mortgagee and general creditors; without in
any way indicating Chief Justice Gibson's "I speak not of matters
71. For one thing the description of the realty was not signed by the seller;
the contract was not filed within 10 days after the making thereof nor was it
refiled within 30 days prior to the expiration of 3 years from the original filing
thereof. This last fault was excusable, perhaps, as the receivership has intervened.
Given the Pennsylvania hostility to conditional sales, the other defects would seem
sufficient to dispose of the case, especially in a jurisdiction later depriving a chattel
mortgagee of his lien because a duly acknowledged chattel mortgage was not wit-
nessed. See Arcady Farms Milling Co. v. Sedler, 367 Pa. 314, 80 A.2d 845 (1951).
72. Central Lithograph Co. v. Eatmor Chocolate Co. (Appeal of Eline's) and Ibid.(Appeal of Minneapolis Securities Corp.), supra note 67.
73. Ibid (Appeal of Ball Ice Machine Co.), supra note 67.
74. The passage from the lower court's opinion is taken from the record on
appeal. The passage from the opinion of the Supreme Court is from Appeal of
Eline's, Inc., supra note 67, 316 Pa. at 309, 175 Atl. at 701.
75. See supra notes 10 and 54.
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between landlord and tenant" limitation; or the distinction, recognized
in the Harkins case, 76 of cases involving the interest of a bailment
lessor. The prior cases were distinguished by admitting that
* . while [they were] cases of conditional sales and a bailment
lease in which we decided that the conditional vendor or lessor
had the right to remove the property, [they] are none of them
cases of manufacturing establishments in which the removal of
the property sold would impair the integrity of the plant." 77
The American Laundry Machinery Co."8 case was also brushed aside
by stating that the case
"was decided by us per curiam and the broad question here pre-
sented was not passed upon. The point in issue, whether the
machinery was personal or real property, was decided solely on
the intention of the parties when it was installed. This is not
the controlling factor in the. present case." 79
These purported distinctions do not coincide with the holdings
or the discussion in the cases themselves.80 It appears that the court
76. See text at note 56 supra.
77. Central Lithograph Co. v. Eatmor Chocolate Co. (Appeal of Ball Ice Machine
Co.), supra note 67, 316 Pa. at 315, 175 Atd. at 702. The cases so distinguished
were Wickes Bros. v. Island Park Ass'n, note 40 supra; Ridgway Dynamo &
Elec. Co. v. Werder, note 44 supra; National Theatre Supply Co. v. Mishler Theatre
Co., note 65 supra and Moller, Inc. v. Mainker, 314 Pa. 314, 171 Atl. 476 (1934).
The Court does not discuss why loss of electricity does not impair the integrity of
an amusement park (Wickes), a motor generator set the integrity of a mine
(Ridgway), seats the integrity of a theatre (Mishler) or a pipe organ the integrity
of a theatre (Moller, Inc.).
78. See text at notes 32 and 33 supra.
79. Central Lithograph Co. v. Eatmor Chocolate Co., supra note 67, 316 Pa. at
308, 175 Atl. at 700.
80. See supra note 77. As to the American Laundry Machinery Co. case the
quoted statement may literally be true under the language of the per curiam
opinion, which was several pages long. The statement ignores the following from
the opinion of Valentine, J. in the C.P. Court of Luzerne County.
"The main contention of the defendant is, that as the machinery in question
was necessary to the operation of the plant, it became a fixture, and as such
a part of the real estate. Titus v. Poland Coal Co., 275 Pa. 432. .. ."
Record on appeal p. 16a. This puts the industrial mortgage doctrine squarely in
issue I
The purported distinction also ignores the entire issue as tendered by Appellant
in its brief, namely that the machinery had become realty (brief of appellant p. 35)
and its lengthy citations from Bullock v. Traction Co. (brief of appellant p. 47), the
discussion of Case v. L'Oeble, 84 Fed. 582 (brief on appeal pp. 38-39) and the entire
arguments of apparent ownership in the mortgagor created by the bailor when he
installed machinery creating a laundry in an empty building.
The chronology of the American Laundry case was 1st a bailment lease, 2nd
a mortgage of land, buildings and machinery, with a clause covering after acquired
machinery, and 3rd a subsequent bailment lease of additional machinery. The bailment
lessor won on both leases.
That the lower court did not decide the case solely on the intent of the parties
is also indicated by the following p'assage from its discussion of the case:
"As between the Laundry Company and the intervening Trust Company it
might be inequitable to regard the machinery as personalty, so also as between
the Trust Company and other creditors of the Laundry Company. But does it
[VOL. 4: p. 498
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construed the words "material injury to the freehold" so as to compel
the holder of a legislatively recognized chattel security interest to
give a gift to a prior real estate mortgagee. Thus, the real estate
mortgagee was given greater rights than he had been given in the
prior decisional law.
Equally noteworthy is the fact that the court did not prefer the
interest of the prior real property mortgagee upon any theory of vested
property rights not subject to legislative change, but purely as a
matter of statutory interpretation against a change in what the court,
erroneously as this writer believes, conceived the common law to be."'
Cases After the Eatmor Decisions
What the legislature conceived the law to be, was rather promptly
made clear by the amendatory act of 1935, which specifically provided
that chattels subject to conditional sales agreements did not become
part of any industrial plant.8 2 Strangely, only one case has been
found under the 1935 amendment, and this, as we shall see, gave it
but a passing mention."s The other cases all involve the "material
follow that as between the bailor, who never parted with title, and the inter-
vening defendant, the purchaser at the Sheriff's sale at which the real estate
had been sold as the bailee's property, and who is also the holder of a mortgage
executed by the bailee, that the machinery is to be regarded as real estate to the
prejudice of the plaintiff? We think not.
"The mortgages covered the machinery owned by the Laundry Company
or later purchased by it and placed in the building, but bound only the
interest of the Laundry Company as bailee of the machinery in question, as title
to it always remained in the plaintiff." (record on appeal pp. 17a & 18a).
81. The court said "To give the language used the meaning for which the
appellee contends and to which the court below assented would be to change our
common law and a change from the common law cannot be presumed; it must
appear to have been meant or it will be held not to have been made." (citing cases).
"We, therefore, hold that the words realty and freehold mean the plant in its
complete integrity." Appeal of Eline's, Inc., supra note 67, 316 Pa. at 309, 175 Atl.
at 701.
It is unfortunate that counsel for the conditional vendors spent most of their argu-
ment in these cases in support of the analogy to McConnell v. Chelton Trust Co.,
282 Fed. 105 (3d Cir. 1922), a case reversing an award to a mortgagee of lathes,
presses, etc. for making silk working machinery installed in a machine shop making
only printing press machinery when mortgaged. The attempt to establish an
exception to the Voorhees v. Freeman line of cases for machinery installed for a
"new business" failed on two counts, first chocolate candies were not considered
sufficiently different from milk chocolate, and second the entire distinction was not
accepted.
The effort to establish the McConnell case, however, may have diverted atten-
tion from a careful evaluation of the real basis behind the industrial mortgage doc-
trine.
82. Act of July 12, 1935, P.L. 658 amended § 7 of the Uniform Act to read
in part,
"Goods to be affixed to the realty shall not become a part of the said realty,
or of the freehold to which they are attached or are to be attached, or of any
operating plant of which they may form a part, but shall be treated as severable
and subject to removal ......
83. See text following note 107 infra. The case is Royal Store Fixture Co. v.
Patten, 183 Pa. Super. 249, 130 A.2d 271 (1957).
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injury to the freehold" language. Once the Eatmor construction of
this language is adoped, the provision for severing, even though the
injury is material, upon posting a bond to cover the cost of repairs,
becomes meaningless, as the amount of the damage to be repaired
would be the cost of replacing the machinery being removed. 4
The interpretation preferring the prior real estate mortgagee
established in the Eatmor case furnished precedent for many situations.
The conditional vendor lost in the following cases: a furnace in a
private house,85 elevators in a multi-story office building,86 beer meters
required by law to be installed in a brewery, 7 quarrying machinery
for conversion of a coal mine to a stone quarry,88 and elevators in a
five story apartment building.89 The doctrine did not prevent a condi-
tional vendor from removing a pipe organ from a church, the prayer
book of which nowhere required the playing of an organ,9" or a
conditional vendor of furniture to a hotel from repossessing the
furniture.9 1
84. This probably accounts for the absence of cases on whether the tendered
bond was sufficient, and for the frequent failure to tender any bond, and to attempt
to show that the machinery was in no way "affixed", and hence did not come within
§ 7 at all. See, e.g. In re Lloyd, 6 F. Supp. 515 (M.D. Pa. 1934) (conditional
sale of refrigeration machinery and a failure to file for two and one half years
not fatal under § 5 of Uniform Act, § 7 not applicable) ; cf. In re Inber Bros., Inc.,
5 F. Supp. 513, aff'd sub nom. Lainson v. Blad, 68 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1933).
85. Holland Furnace Co. v. Suzik, 118 Pa. Super. 405, 180 Ati. 38 (1935).
86. Medical Tower Corporation v. Otis Elevator Co., 104 F.2d 133 (3d Cir.
1939). In this case the district court held for the conditional vendor. It distinguished
the Eatmor cases on the ground that in those cases the conditional sales contracts
had not been properly filed, and that the amendatory act of 1935, supra note 82, showed
that the proper criterion under the 1927 act was physical damage.
87. In re Penn Brewing Co., 21 F. Supp. 633 (M.D. Pa. 1937) aff'd sub nom.
Smith v. McKenna Brass Co., 98 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1938). Here also on other
machinery the mortgagor's consent to removal under the conditional sale contract
bound him as purchaser at foreclosure sale. Obviously, on a properly filed contract,
all subsequent purchasers would be bound, including, perhaps purchasers at a fore-
closure sale. What of purchasers at a foreclosure sale under a mortgage where the
mortgagee is entitled to prevail over the conditional sale? Presumably the pur-
chaser must succeed to the rights of the mortgagee. But cf. National Theatre Supply
Co. v. Mishler Theatre Supply Co., supra note 65 (subsequent purchaser lost).
88. McClure v. Atlantic Rock Co., 339 Pa. 296, 14 A.2d 124 (1940) (But
here interest of holder of purchase money interest was not involved. Issue was
between creditor and tenant and purchase money mortgagee of landlord who bought
as operating coal plant, tenant converted to quarry). A similar holding was made in
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. American Assembling Machine Co., 350 Pa. 300,
38 A.2d 220 (1944). Special factors were present in each case which further justi-
fied the holding as an exception to the tenant fixture rule.
89. Land Title Bank & Trust Co. v. Stout, 339 Pa. 302, 14 A.2d 282 (1940).
Actually in this case, as in Medical Tower Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., supra note
86, the doctrine was not necessary to the decision. On the basis of Clayton v.
Lienhard, supra note 57, elevators could have been classed as being in the first class.
Then, too, as the elevators were purchased by a contractor in connection with new
construction, the case could have been handled as a conditional sale for resale, and
the mortgagee and owner protected as bona fide purchasers in ordinary course.
90. Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Security Trust Co., 133 Pa. Super. 18, 1
A.2d 520 (1938). See also supra note 59.
91. In re Philadelphia Co. for Guaranteeing Mortgages, Trustee (No. 1), 37 D &
C 47 (C.P. Phila. 1939).
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On the conventional side, not involving a retained purchase money
interest in a chattel, the doctrine was applied to prefer the real estate
mortgagee over the trustee in bankruptcy with respect to occasionally
used machinery of an ornamental iron works,92 to preserve the lien
of a judgment on machinery of a food processing and wholesale busi-
ness as against a trustee in bankruptcy where the judgment antedated
bankruptcy by more than four months,93 to prevent the removal by a
lessee of the mortgagor of electric transformers and a large air con-
ditioning machine used in a restaurant.94
Equally, it was made clear that the granting clause of the real
estate mortgage need make no mention of machinery or equipment,
or that a factory or industrial plant is involved.95
So far as the cases are concerned, the doctrine of the "industrial
plant mortgage" was thus applied to a private house, a multi-story
office building, a five story apartment house, an ornamental iron works,
food wholesaler, a restaurant, a stone quarry, and was considered
in the case of a church and a hotel. What then, is to be considered
an industrial plant?
Applications in Tax Law
Those who are troubled by a feeling that there should be a
symmetry of decision in the law will be disturbed by a contemporaneous
development in the law of taxation where the court says it is applying
the Voorhis v. Freeman rule. In 1948, in United Laundries v. Board
of Property Assessment,"6 the court sustained the Allegheny County
92. In re Taylor & Dean Mfg. Co., 136 F.2d 370 (3rd Cir. 1943).
93. In re Ginsburg, 255 F.2d 358 (3rd Cir. 1958).
94. City of Philadelphia, Trustee v. Kugler's Restaurant Co., 52 D & C 375
(C.P. Phila. 1945) (Here, as in the Continental Bank case, supra note 88, the
lessee and lessor-mortgagor were, respectively, corporations of common stock owner-
ship and parent and subsidiary. It is possible that this relationship had a powerful
influence on the result). Cf. 339-41 Market Street Corp. v. Darling Stores Corp.,
355 Pa. 312, 49 At. 686 (1946) where, on an issue between landlord and tenant,
the tenant was allowed to remove from a store for the sale of women's apparel, a
3,000 pound air conditioning unit in the basement connected to the upstairs store
by air ducts.
95. Roos v. Fairy Silk Mills, 334 Pa. 305, 5 A.2d 569 (1939) (first mortgage,
making no mention of machinery, has prior lien over second mortgage expressly re-
ferring to machinery). See also First National Bank v. Reichneder, 371 Pa. 463, 91
A.2d 277 (1952) (first mortgage on land and appurtenances has lien on machinery
subsequently placed in plant prior to chattel mortgage, not for purchase money, placed
on the machinery after installation). The problem in Reichneder cannot arise under
the Code since, under § 9-313, the security interest must attach before affixation
or integration into the operating plant.
96. 359 Pa. 195, 58 A.2d 822 (1948), reversing 161 Pa. Super. 412, 54 A.2d
912 (1947) holding that laundry establishments did not come within the words of
the statute taxing "All real estate to wit: Houses, lands, lots of ground and ground
rents, mills and manufactories of all kinds, furnaces, forges, bloomeries, distilleries,
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Board of Property Assessment in applying the industrial plant doc-
trine to a laundry company and including the value of all of its ma-
chinery as real estate for tax purposes. The court specifically ruled
that the doctrine was not limited to manufacturing plants, ignoring
the distinction in Eatmor of prior cases on the ground that they did
not involve manufacturing plants. 7
As a result of this decision, several of the laundries later objected
to the valuation of their real estate on the basis of a systematic under-
assessment of similar properties." The gravamen of their complaint
was that the Allegheny County Board was guilty of discrimination
in not applying the industrial plant rule to "other industries such as
cabs, theatres, service stations, automobile repair companies, restau-
rants, stores, office buildings, hotels, beauty shops, banks and self
service laundries ... "
This challenge was accepted by the court in 1951, which stated
that the issue was whether any of the classes of establishment men-
tioned by the complaining laundries was an industrial plant. 9 But
then the court, which had applied the Eatmor doctrine to an apartment
house, and had approved decisions applying the doctrine to an office
building and a private residence, went on to say:
"The answer to that question is self evident. By no stretch
of the imagination could a bank building, a hotel, a theatre or any
sugar houses, malt houses, breweries, tan yards, fisheries, and ferries, wharves, and
all other real estate not exempt from taxation." Act of May 22, 1933, § 201 P.L. 853,
Art. II, § 20, as amended by the Act of July 2, 1941, P.L. 219, § 1.
97. Actually, the sentence making the distinction is in the alternative, i.e.,
that the cases either do not involve industrial plants, or do not involve machinery
essential to the integrity of the operating plant. The non-essential character of the
machinery involved in the cases (note 77 supra) does not seem a valid distinction
in view of the actual decrees in the Eatmor cases, as set out in the record on
appeal, which spread the lien of the mortgage to such things as the sign board in
the factory, neon sign on smokestack, electric scales, boxes of electric light bulbs,
house telephone system, soap dispensers in wash rooms, boxes of screws, bolts,
nuts, etc., hand drills, grease guns, portable welders and hand trucks for moving
materials and supplies in the factory. Excluded from the lien of the mortgage were
the office furniture and machinery, one lawn mower, one garden hose and sprinkler
and three step ladders. In Reichneder, the exclusions were the office machinery and
equipment and the beer delivery trucks.
The writer confesses to an inability to understand why soap dispensers and an
intra-mural telephone are essential to the operating integrity of a plant, while inability
to keep records or send out bills (caused by the lack of office furniture and machinery)
is not considered significant.
Yet such are the holdings under the industrial mortgage doctrine in a jurisdiction
in which, under the rule that a levying creditor may not seize a railroad piecemeal,
office furniture and machinery has been held to be essential to the operation of the
railroad. See, e.g., McNulty Bros. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 272 Pa. 442, 116 Atl.
362 (1922).
98. In Pennsylvania such a ground is sufficient for judicial relief from an assess-
ment.
99. North Side Laundry Co. v. Board of Property Assessment, 366 Pa. 636, 79
A.2d 419 (1951).
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of the other business establishments referred to by plaintiff be
considered as an industrial plaint. It is true that we sometimes
speak of the 'movie industry,' 'the hotel industry' or 'the banking
industry' but that is merely a loose use of language to convey the
idea that the business is a sizeable one. In spite of that colloqui-
alism we do not speak of the buildings housing such businesses
as 'industrial plants' .... The law can do no better than to define
an industrial plant as that type of establishment which an ordinary
man thinks of as such. Certainly a commercial laundry comes
within that definition but the other businesses here mentioned
do not." 100
Recent Cases
Two further cases involving conditional sales deserve mention.
The first is Schnebbe Fire Protection Co. v. Sandt Estate,'' involving
a possible conditional sale of a sprinkler system to a public garage,
and salesroom for automobiles, and the conflicting interest of a prior
real estate mortgagee. The case is not very satisfactory because counsel
for the sprinkler vendor did not file a clear complaint, and, when his
motion for judgment on the pleadings was denied, introduced little
or no evidence. °2 Nevertheless, it was obvious from the pleadings
that the sprinkler system was installed long after the building was
constructed, and, therefore, could have been installed in a fashion
that would permit easy removal.
From an adverse judgment, the sprinkler company appealed.
The parties. argued. whether the contract involved was or was not a
conditional sales agreement; whether, under Section 7 of the Uniform
Act, plaintiff could or could not remove the property as against the
prior real estate mortgagee; and whether on the record before the
court the sprinkler system was or was not integrated into the realty.
100. North Side Laundry Co. v. Board of Property Assessment, supra note 99,
366 Pa. at 639-40, 79 A.2d at 421. The exclusion of theatres may be a possible
explanation of the holdings in Mishler supra note 65, and Moller, Inc. supra note 77.
The exclusion of self service laundries must have been particularly irksome. News-
paper publishing plants have, however, been held to be within the purview of the
taxing statute.
101. 365 Pa. 278, 74 A.2d 104 (1950).
102. The record on appeal discloses that counsel declared as for money loaned,
secured by a written contract! The contract was one whereby the Schnabbe Co.
agreed to install a "series of fire retarding devices" and procure fire insurance
at reduced rates. The garage owner made annual payments equal to the insurance
premiums previously paid. The Schnabbe Co. was to repay itself over the term
of the contract out of the savings in insurance rates. There was no averment con-
necting the sprinkler system with the "series of fire retarding devices" referred to in
the contract, or to show who owned the sprinkler system before it was installed, or
as to the extent of the injury that would occur both to the building and to the
sprinkler system. Hence a trial was necessary.
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On the basis of Clayton v. Lienhard,0 3 and completely ignoring
the discussion in that case of the detailed integration of the particular
sprinkler system into the building, and further ignoring the fact that
the Clayton decision was one protecting the installer of the sprinkler
system, the court in Schnebbe ruled that the sprinkler system had be-
come real estate, irrespective of the intention of the parties, as be-
longing in the second of the three classes delineated in Clayton v.
Lienhard. °4
The court then stated that this ruling made it unnecessary to con-
sider questions about conditional sales.
This case involved a factual situation occurring in 1930, but not
reaching the court until 1950. Such a time schedule cried out against
a decision for a new trial. Actually, therefore, the case can mean no
more than a holding that a conditional vendor cannot replevy a
sprinkler system on pleadings which do not describe the mode of
affixation or the extent of integration into the building." 5
Finally, we have, in the superior court, the case of Royal Store
Fixture Co. v. Patten,1'0 which was a replevin action by the conditional
vendor of a frozen custard stand and walk-in cooler erected for a
tenant on land leased from defendant. The lease was dated March 2,
1953, and the conditional sales contract was dated April 13, 1953,
and was duly filed on April 18, 1953. Thus the case is the only case
the writer has found involving the Uniform Conditional Sales Act as
amended by the Act of 1935.
Under the lease, buildings erected by the tenant became the prop-
erty of the landlord at the end of the term. The landlord, however,
signed a "landlord's waiver" which said that "the aforesaid equip-
ment shall be exempt from distress for rent as long as title thereto re-
mains in Royal Store Fixture Co." Before signing the form as pre-
sented, the landlord had added a clause stating that the waiver "shall
in no other way affect" the lease.
The building was thereafter assembled on defendant's land, erected
on foundations provided by the lessee, and connected to water lines,
electric lines and to a cesspool.
103. See supra note 57.
104. See text at notes 59, 60 and 61, supra.
105. Actually, this was the holding of the C.P. Court on motion for judgment
on the pleadings. At the trial counsel for the Schnabbe Co. sought a ruling that he
could introduce evidence without prejudice to his right to appeal from the refusal
to grant him judgment on the pleadings. When this ruling was not forthcoming
he offered no further evidence. Decision, of necessity, had to be against the plain-
tiff. The Supreme Court, it seems, felt that some fifteen years of litigation was
enough and rendered an opinion terminating the litigation.
106. 183 Pa. Super. 249, 130 A.2d 271 (1957).
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The landlord contended that the building was realty, not subject
to replevin, and that the waiver relating only to distress for rent did
not waive other- provisions of the lease vesting title in the landlord.
As is customary in Pennsylvania, the jury was asked, inter alia,
to determine whether the building was personalty or realty. The jury
found for the plaintiff, the conditional vendor.
On appeal, the superior court felt that Clayton v. Lienhard stated
the controlling rule, but made the following points. First, it could
not be ruled as a matter of law that the building was real estate re-
gardless of the intent of the parties. 11 7 While buildings ordinarily
fell into the second class of the Clayton v. Lienhard trilogy, the court
felt that this need not always be the case. Second, the amendment to
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act in 1935 showed that there was
no merit to the landlord's contention about material injury to the
freehold under Section 7 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. Third,
that the immunity granted from distress for rent included the right
of the conditional vendor to remove the building on default, notwith-
standing the added clause reserving all other rights.
The two most recent judicial applications of the industrial plant
mortgage doctrine do not involve the major conflict of interest with
which we are here concerned. First National Bank of Mount Carmel
v. Reichneder... was a conflict between a prior real estate mortgagee
and a chattel mortgagee of chattels affixed or related to the realty
before the chattel mortgage was placed thereon. The prior real estate
mortgagee was expressly preferred by the terms of the Chattel Mort-
gage Act of 1945 which stated that "any real estate mortgage covering
the realty and chattels attached to the realty shall remain a prior lien
to a chattel mortgage placed subsequently thereon .. .""' The second
case, In re Ginsburg,"' in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, involved a conflict between the lien of a judgment
entered more than four months before bankruptcy and the trustee in
bankruptcy acting for general creditors, a classic case for the applica-
tion of the doctrine.
107. The Court cited White's Appeal, 10 Pa. 253 (1849); and Kile v. Giebner,
114 Pa. 381, 7 Atl. 154 (1886).
108. 371 Pa. 463, 91 A.2d 277 (1952).
109. The Act approved June 1, 1945, P.L. 1358, § 5. See Note, 95 U. PA. L. Rgv.
396 at 401 (1947).
110. 225 F.2d 358 (3d Cir. 1958).
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Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code
Where does all of this leave us? The Uniform Commercial Code
in Section 9-313,"' as adopted effective July 1, 1954, in clear and
unequivocal language, prefers the unpaid purchase money security
interest over the prior real estate mortgagee. Is there anything in
the so-called industrial plant mortgage doctrine which prevents the
court from giving effect to this statutory rule?
The foregoing discussion of the cases sustains, the writer be-
lieves, the conclusion that, prior to the Eatmor decisions, the court
sustained the recognized chattel security interest, as against the in-
terest of a prior real property mortgagee, in every case in which the
conflict arose. As between the general creditors of the mortgagor,
and others whose rights could rise no higher than the mortgagor, the
industrial plant mortgage doctrine preferred the real property mort-
gagee. This preference is perfectly consistent with the policy against
piece-meal dismemberment of industrial plants that so disturbed Chief
Justice Gibson in Voorhis v. Freeman."2
Eatmor 13 and subsequent cases, except the Royal Store Fixture
Co." 4 case, are all cases decided under a statute making the test one
of material injury to the freehold, interpreted as meaning injury to
the operating integrity of the thing mortgaged."' This interpretation
of the 1925 statute, it is submitted, arose largely from the well known
Pennsylvania common-law hostility to the conditional sale as a chattel
security device. This device has now had four decades of respect-
ability. Judges familiar with the many uses of the conditional sale
can be expected to have a more tolerant attitude toward the more
definite language of the Uniform Commercial Code. Furthermore, as
the court itself recognized in Eatmor, that case enunciated no great
constitutional principle, it was merely a case of statutory interpreta-
tion against a change in what the 'court considered to be the common-
law meaning of the word "freehold." 116
111. The Act approved April 6, 1953, P.L. 3; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A,
§ 9-313.
112. It must be reiterated that Justice Gibson, apparently, was concerned with
the policy of the "inquisition" statute and the need to assure to the cotton-spinner
the same ability to pay off his debts from the profits of his business as the farmer
had. See supra note 16.
113. See supra note 67.
114. See supra note 106.
115. This was the test introduced under the Act approved May 1, 1923, P.L. 117,
and was continued in the Uniform Act until the amendment of the Act approved
July 12, 1935, P.L. 658.
116. See supra note 81.
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Constitutional Issues
If the foregoing analysis is correct, the application of Section
9-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code to Pennsylvania mortgages
made prior to July 1, 1954, the date of the adoption of the Code, pre-
sents no insuperable problem. The law of the obligation of contract is
the law as it existed when the mortgage was made.117 If court or legis-
lature subsequently enlarge a mortgagee's rights by interpretation of a
subsequently enacted statute, it is constitutional to restore the status
quo.'1 Thus, mortgages given before the Eatmor decision, or at least
before the enactment of the statute it interpreted, had no rights
superior to those of a recognized bailment lease interest, that is, of a
recognized purchase money chattel security interest. As to such mort-
gages, the restoration of the interpretation placed on the Act of 1915
by the Ridgway case" 9 is clearly constitutional. As to mortgages
placed in the period when the Act of 1925, as interpreted by the
Eatmor cases, was in force, that is, in the decade from 1925 to the
amendment of 1935, the situation is a bit more obscure. Eatmor did
not refer to the industrial plant mortgage rule as a rule of property.
When the court did so in Harkins it was careful to exclude cases in-
volving the rights of a bailment lessor. 2 ' The right, if it existed, of
a mortgagee to divest the retained title of a vendor of a chattel, if
the mortgagor should ever purchase a chattel in such circumstances,
seems of a different quality from the right of an income beneficiary
of a trust, which has come into being and operation, to insist upon
the rules allocating funds between income and principal, and the like.' 2 '
117. See, e.g., Beaver County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Winowch, 323 Pa. 483, 489,
187 Atd. 481, 484 (1936).
118. South Carolina v. Gillard, 101 U.S. 433 (1879).
119. See supra note 44. This case clearly disposes of any claimed invalidity
under the Pennsylvania constitutional prohibition against special legislation creating
new liens or altering the method of collecting debts. PA. CONST. art. 3, § 7.
120. See text at note 56 supra.
121. Arensberg, Chattel Mortgages and Industrial Plant Mortgages, 23 PA. BAR
ASS'N Q. 125 (1952) cites Crawford's Estate, 363 Pa. 458, 67 A.2d 124 (1949) and
Williamson's Estate, 368 Pa. 343, 82 A.2d 49 (1957) as sustaining the possible unconsti-
tutionality of the application of § 9-313 to "industrial plant mortgages" created prior
to the passage of the Code. Robinson, McGough, and Scheinholtz, The Effect of the
Uniform Commercial Code on the Pennsylvania Industrial Plant Doctrine, 16 U. PiTvr.
L. REv. 89 (1951) cites, to the same effect, Williamson's Estate and Farmers Nat'l
Bank and Trust Co. v. Berks County Real Estate Co., 333 Pa. 390, 5 A.2d 94
(1939). Mr. Wood in his able supplement to Judge Ladner's book refers to such
cases as Beaver County Building & Loan Ass'n v. Winowich, 323 Pa. 483, 187 Ati.
481 (1936).
It is submitted that none of these decisions is controlling. Crawford's Estate is
summarized in the text. Winowich held unconstitutional a Deficiency Judgment Act
which removed the mortgagee's remedy completely; the statute acted directly upon
the contract between mortgagor and mortgagee. Williamson's Estate held that the
repeal of a statute forbidding two commissions on principal to one who was both
executor and trustee could not affect the right of beneficiaries of a trust created
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The mortgagee cannot claim a vested right in all of the rules of the
common law. Most courts have uniformly held that the legislature
cannot give a mechanics lien general priority over a prior existing
mortgage, 122 but where the priority has been limited to the fixture
installed by the lienor, or. the added value so created, the change in
law has been upheld even as to prior mortgages. 123  The analogy
seems apt in the situation under consideration; and in the case of
security interests in chattels to be affixed to realty, created after July
1, 1954, Section 9-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code should
govern the rights of mortgages created between 1925 and 1935.
Conclusion
What then, is the dividing line between the cases, if any, in
which the interest of the prior real property mortgagee will be pre-
ferred, and those in which the subsequent financer of the chattel will
prevail? It is submitted that the distinction lies in an intelligent
application of the doctrines of Clayton v. Lienhard.24 That case also
explains the actual decisions in the cases involving recognized chattel
security interests.
Where, as in Clayton v. Lienhard itself, the particular apparatus
or machinery is a physically integrated portion of a structure classified
as real estate, the interest of the prior real estate mortgagee should be
preferred. This could justify decisions preferring such mortgagee in
the case of attempted conditional sales of elevators to be installed
prior to the repeal against the trustee-executor agreeing to become such also prior
to the repeal.
Farmers Nat'l Bank involved the rights, as against creditors, of one claiming
under an unrecorded deed taken when by law such deeds were valid against creditors.
The case is really one of statutory construction, the court concluding that the absence
of a grace period for recording of prior deeds proved a legislative intent not to
affect such prior deeds.
Crawford's Estate specifically recognized that no one has a vested interest in a
rule of law as such, saying at 362 Pa. 458, 464, 67 A.2d 124, 128 (1949) :
"Where, however, the interest is inchoate or a mere expectancy the Legis-
lature may modify or terminate it . . . . Thus in the case of inchoate dower the
Legislature may modify or destroy the interest during the life of the spouse,
but not after the death, as the interest becomes consummate by the death of
the husband ....
Statutes converting joint tenancies into tenancies in common during the life of both
tenants, and converting a fee tail into a fee simple were also cited by the court.
The interest of the prior mortgagee in chattels that might later be affixed
by the mortgagor seems equally a "mere expectancy."
122. Page v. Carr, 232 Pa. 371, 81 Atl. 430 (1911) and see Annot. 121 A.L.R.
623 (1939), and Annot., 141 A.L.R. 68 (1942).
123. See, e.g., Dunham Lumber Co. v. Gresz, 71 N.D. 491, 2 N.W.2d 175 (1942)
cf. the reference to the Illinois statute in Myer v. Berlandi, 39 Minn. 438, 40 N.W.
513 (1888).
124. See supra note 57.
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in multi-story buildings as a part of the original construction. 125  No
industrial plant doctrine need be applied here. The decision can be
justified on the rationale that the particular items have lost their char-
acter as "goods" or even as "goods affixed or related to the realty"
and have become realty itself. One would expect such a result to be
reached in the case of bricks, lumber, mortar, structural steel and like
items fashioned into parts of a building, and Section 9-313 of the
Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in Connecticut, Massachusetts
and Kentucky specifically so provides.' 26 The more difficult issues will
be as to the "and like" items.2 7 Cases involving machinery bolted or
screwed to the floors of buildings, or resting thereon of their own weight
should be placed in the third classification of the Clayton v. Lienhard
trilogy.2 8 Eatmor and allied cases can and should then be recognized
for what they were, namely, cases interpreting a statute, the language
of which is no longer applicable.
Decision in cases of the third class should be made on the basis
of an evaluation of the conflicting interests before the court, and a
determination of the policy to be served. As Chief Justice Gibson
recognized a century ago, 12 a decision between mortgagee and general
creditors necessarily "speaks not" of matters between landlord and
tenant, or, for that matter, between a prior mortgagee of the realty
and the subsequent holder of a perfected security interest in a chattel
affixed to the realty. The so-called industrial plant mortgage doctrine
should be recognized, with the limitations inherent in its origin, as
applying between mortgagor and mortgagee, mortgagee and general
creditors of the mortgagor, and between the prior real estate mortgagee
and any subsequent non-purchase money chattel security interest. 30
125. E.g., the Medical Tower case, supra note 86 and the Stout case, supra
note 89.
126. As adopted in these three jurisdictions, and as provided for in the pending
House Bill 689 of the 1959 Session of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, § 9-313
excepts from the provisions giving the purchase money interest in the chattel if
perfected prior to affixation (i.e., attachment to or affixation with the realty) bricks,
lumber, structural steel, mortar, and the like.
127. One difficulty with statutory drafting is the difficulty in finding language
that will ensure the abandonment of prior judicial rulings. To the writer it seems
obvious that the "and the like" items phrase is used in the physical sense. But
like a woman, "a court convinced against its will is of the same opinion still." Having
the last word, courts could inject the "institutional theory" back into the amended
Code by interpreting the "and the like" to mean all things classified legally as real
estate under the law prior to the Code. Both the Official Comments and the legis-
lative history of the reasons for the change from the Pennsylvania form to the
Massachusetts form, however, require rejection of any such attempt to revive the
Eatmor cases.
128. See text at note 61 supra.
129. See text at note 17 supra.
130. As, in fact, the doctrine was applied in cases such as Voorhis v. Freeman,
supra note 10; Pyle v. Pennock, supra note 18; Roberts v. The Dauphin Deposit
Bank, supra note 19; Christian v. Dripps, supra note 21; Ege v. Kille, supra note 35;
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Thus, Pennsylvania industry will be able to secure adequate
financing for expansion and modernization of plants, so necessary
for business survival in the rapid technological advancement of today.
And such a result will not be at all unfair to the interests of mort-
gagees. The lien of the mortgage will, of course, attach to the mort-
gagor's interest in the chattels. In the day of trouble the unpaid
chattel vendor's right of removal can, of course, be conditioned upon
the failure of the receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, mortgagee, or bond-
holders' committee to give adequate assurance of the payment of the
unpaid portion of the purchase price."' 1 Thus, the interests of both
real estate mortgagee and the holder of the purchase money security
interest in new machinery can be protected, and neither will be forced
to make an unwarranted gift to the other.
Titus v. Poland Coal Co., supra note 38; Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Hawkins, supra
note 54; Pennsylvania Chocolate Co. cases, supra note 67; Ross v. Fairy Silk Mills,
supra note 95; First Nat'l Bank v. Reichneder, supra note 95 and In re Ginsberg,
supra note 1.
131. As was in fact recognized in Collins v. Bellefonte Central R.R. Co., supra
note 25, the courts under Chapter X of the Federal Bankruptcy Act appear to divide
on whether they have power to restrain a conditional vendor's exercise of the right
of repossession on the ground of whether the debtor may be considered to have
"property" in the chattel where title is retained by the vendor. As any one familiar
with the cases on municipal debt limitations knows, the interest in preserving the
"equity" built up by prior payments has been considered sufficient to make the
unpaid balance under a conditional sales agreement a debt. The same interest should
be a sufficient "property" to permit the reorganization court to control the exercise
of the right of repossession. Such control affords additional protection to the in-
dustrial mortgagee.
[VOL.. 4: p. 498
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